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NATURE OF THE CASE
Action for damages and injunctive relief and attorney's
fees for alleged willful violation of appellant's lease.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
In a jury trial a general verdict was rendered in favor
of appellant in the amount of $65,000.

The judgment on this

verdict is the subject of respondent Price Rentals, Inc. appeal in Appeal No. 16588.

Following the jury's verdict and

judgment thereon, the lower court, the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft presiding, on July 2, 1979, denied plaintiff's motion
for injunctive relief and by an order filed September 12,
1979, denied appellant's motion to assess attorney's fees.
[1216, 1659]
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Penelko, Inc. seeks reversal of the lower
court's order filed July 2, 1979, denying plaintiff's motion
for injunctive relief and an order of the Supreme Court
ordering injunctive relief as prayed for in the complaint.
Appellant, Penelko, Inc. also seeks reversal of the
lower court's order filed September 12, 1979, denying appellant's motion for attorney's fees and an order of the Supreme
Court directinq the lower court to fix appellant's attorney's
fees including reasonable attorney's fees for work on Price
Rentals,
No.

Inc. Appeal No. 16588, and Penelko, Inc. Appeal

16601.
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MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE
The facts of this cause are set forth in Penelko,
Inc. 's Respondent's Brief in Appeal No. 16588.

We adopt

these facts by reference and set forth below only such additional facts as are particularly relevant to this appeal by
Penelko, Inc.

(appellant) seeking reversal of the trial

court's orders denying it equitable relief and denying it
attorney's fees.
1.

Particular Facts Relating to Appellant's Motion
for Injunctive Relief

On March 24, 1979, the jury brought in a general verdiet in favor of plaintiff, Penelko, Inc., the appellant
herein, on this appeal.

[ 110 4)

Based on this verdict, which constituted a finding by
the jury that Price Rentals, Inc. had violated appellant's
lease, appellant on June 14, 1979, moved for injunctive relief.

[1134]

The motion for injunctive relief was denied

by the court on July 2, 1979.
2.

[1216, 1217]

Particular Facts Relating to Appellant's Motion
for Attorney's Fees

The jury's findings by its general verdict was that
Price Rentals, Inc. had violated appellant's lease.
graph 20 of the lease provided that in

L~e

Para-

event either

party shall fail to perform this lease and agreement according to its terms, such party hereby agrees to pay all costs
and expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees).

[See

paragraph 20 Exh. 1-P]
Paragraph 2 of Malstroms'

lease to Price Rentals, Inc.

dated December 1, 1977, provides that respondent lessee Price
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
2
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Rentals, Inc. shall be in full possession and control of the
leased premises and that the Penelko lease described in Exhibit "A" attached to the agreement is sold, assigned and
transferred in its entirety by the lessor to lessee
Rentals, Inc.

Price

[Paragraph 2 page 3 of Malstrom's lease to

Price Rentals, Inc. Exh. 7-P]
Exhibit "A" of Malstrom's lease to Price Rentals, Inc.
provides that Price Rentals, Inc. is subject to Penelko's
lease.

[See page 2 Exhibit "A" of Exh. 7-P]

The lease is

signed by the Malstroms and by Price Rentals, Inc. by John
Price, president. John Price guarantees the prompt and faithful performance of all of the obligations of the tenant in
the lease.

[See page 20 of Exh. 7-P]

All the violations of appellant's lease were committed
by respondent Price Rentals, Inc. as are set forth in "MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE" in Penelko's respondent's brief,
Appeal No. 16588 incorporated herein by reference.
Prior to the conclusion of the trial in this cause,
appellant submitted instructions to the jury on attorney's
fees.

These instructions were not given by the court.

court writing on the instructions:
by the court. "
court.

The

"Denied--to be determined

And this was reiterated in chambers by the

[See Judge Croft's memorandum decision, 1653]

Con-

sequently, appellant adduced no evidence to the jury
regarding attorney's fees.
After the jury's verdict and the judgment thereon, and
on July 9, 1979, appellant moved for attorney's fees.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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[1104 - 1108, 1221]

Thereafter, on July 19, 1979, Price

Rentals, Inc. filed its

~lot ice

of Appeal.

[1231]

Appellant's attorney, William H. Henderson, filed a
detaileu affidavit showing the services performed in this
cause and requesting attorney's fees for his work in the
amount of $15,000.

(1225 - 1230]

Co-counsel Mark Miner also

filed a like affidavit in support of attorney's fees for his
services in the amount of $15,000 making a total amount requested for attorney's fees of $30,000.

[1245 -

1247]

On September 11, 1979, Judge Croft filed his memorandum
decision denying appellant's attorney's fees.

[1645 -

1649]

In Judge Croft's memorandum decision the court found
that appellant had not waived its claim for attorney's fees
by not submitting 2·;idence inasmuch as appellant was in
effect precluded from submitting evidence by reason of the
court's denial of its instruction on attorney's fees.

(1654]

The court also found that it did not lose jurisdiction
to rule on attorney's fees because Price Rentals, Inc. had
filed its notice of appeal before it had ruled on appellant's motion for attorney's fees.

The court ruled that it

retained jurisdiction on this undecided issue.

(1653 -

1654]

The court also ruled that the issue of attorney's fees
was for the court.

[ 1653]

The court further found that the cause was submitted
to the jury, "Based upon a breach of plaintiff's
lease".

[appellant's]

And in such case it mattered not "whether the alleged

breach of the lease smacks of tort or contract."

[1655]

4
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The lower court, per Judqe Croft in his memorandum
decision, denied appellant's motion for attorney's fees on
the sole qround that there was lack of privity between appellant and Price Rentals, Inc. and that as the covenant
for attorney's fees in appellant's lease was not one runninq
with the land, it was not binding

on Price Rentals, Inc. ,

citing Latses v. Nick, Inc. 99 Utah 214, 104 p 2d 619,
[1655-1656).
On September 14, 1979, formal order denying appellant's
motion for attorney's fees was filed with the court.

The

court wrote in this order denying attorney's fees, "For the
reason set forth in the memorandum decision."

[1659)

ARGUMENT
I.

ANSWERING PRICE RENTALS' POINT I THAT THE LOWER
COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT A MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE QUESTION CONCERNING
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS MOOT BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS
SOLD ITS THEATER AND LEASEHOLD PROPERTY.

A.

Answering Price Rentals' claim that Penelko's claim

for a mandatory injunction is moot.

This contention relates

to Price Rentals' statement on paqe 3 of its brief that followinq the trial, Penelko has assigned its theater lease
recitino the recordations of an assignment June 19, 1980.
Trial was concluded in this case on March 24, 1979
[1104].

The last entry in this cause was September 11, 1979,

when the court denied Penelko's motion for attorney's fees
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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[1645-1649).

Consequently, the lease transaction of

June 19, 1980, was after the trial was concluded and after
rhe record for appeal was transmitted to the Supreme Court.
consequently, Price Rentals refers and relies on facts
Dehors the record.
The well-established rule is that happenings and evidence not presented in the trial court and not in the appellate record are not considered by an appellate court.

The

cause must be decided solely on the evidence presented at
the trial and reflected in the record on appeal.
Re Marriage of Folb, 53 Cal. App.

3d 862

(1966),

But we must reiterate that matters occurring
after judgment are generally not reviewable on
appeal.
Metropolitan Ry Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U.
322 (1904),

s.

"An appellate court considers only such matters

as appear in the record."
Anderson v. Shannon, 146 Kan. 704,

73 P. 2d 5 (1937),

"Syllabus by the Court"

3. Where it does not affirmatively appear
a question raised on appeal was presented to
and determined by the trial court, this court
does not consider it on review.
Ohio v. Ishrnair, 54 Ohio St 2d 402

(1978),

"Syllabus by the Court"
1. A reviewing court cannot add matter to
the record before it, which was not a part of
the trial court's proceedings, and then decide
the appeal on the basis of the new matter.

- 6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lendsay v. Cotton (Fla), 123 So 2d 745 (1960),
Admittedly the record presented to this
court contained exhibits which were not presented to the trial judge at the time of his
dec~s~on and no mo~ion to strike the improper
exhibits was made in this court. Since it is
not the practice of this court to consider
exhibits or other matters not considered by
the trial court, our conclusions are therefore based solely upon those exhibits which
were before the trial court. See Tyson v.
Aikman, 159 Fla. 273, 31 So. 2d 272.
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin, 38 Del. 595, 195 A. 287
(1937).
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error,
§736.

New or Additional Evidence.

Except in the case of trial de novo in the
traditional sense,3 the principle is generally
followed that new or additional evidence cannot
be considered on an appeal, which must be decided solely in the light of the evidence produced in the court below.4
§491.

Generally; Limitation to Matters in Record.

The rights of the parties to an appellate
proceeding must be determined on the record before the appellate court.6
5 C. J. S. Appeal and Error,
§ 1487, pp. 777, 778
so, as a general rule, matters subsequently
communicated or brought to lightl4 or happening after the ruling objected to, 1 ~ and henc~
not considered by the lower court in connection
with the ruling complained of, will not be c~n
sidered on appeal. So the appellate court w711
ordinarily consider an appeal only on.the evidence before the tri~l cou~t a~ the.time of the
ruling in question.l
Affidavi~s filed after
the ruling of the lower court will not be examined l 7 and new facts of which the trial court
had no knowledge will not be introduced.into
the record by judicial notice.18 Pleadings
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 7 -

filed after the ruling complained of will likewise be disregarded on appea1.19
Without waiver of the point above, that Price Rentals
cannot add to the record and have a re-trial of facts not
passed on by the appellate court

we do, nevertheless,

point out the true facts on the transaction; namely:

the

recordation referred to on page 3, Price Rentals' brief,
shows an assignment of Penelko's theater lease to Albertsons,
Inc.

However, Albertsons

specifically agreed in writing

with Penelko to reserve from the property assigned all property rights relating to equitable relief.

This was omitted

from the recorded documents at the request of Albertsons.
But it being indicated that Price Rentals thereafter might
be buying the assignment from Albertsons, Penelko served on
Price Rentals and its attorney on this appeal, a notice of
this reservation.
Consequently, Price Rentals has accomplished its
threat to drive Penelko out of business [1738-1740, 19431944, 2030-2317].

The jury, in its holding against Price

Rentals,found that it did.
Uptown Appliance Radio Co. v. Flint, 122 Utah 249, 249
P. 2d 826, 829,

(1952).

Under these circumstances a court of equity would not
in any event rescue Price Rentals from equitable relief.
Deweese, Jr. v. Reinhard, 165

u.

s. 386, 41 L. Ed. 757

(1897) ,
· ·.A court of equity acts only when and as
conscience commands, and if the conduct of the
-

8 -
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~lai~tiff be offensive to the dictates of natural

Justice, then, whatever may be the rights he
possesses and whatever use he may make of them
in a court of law, he will be held remediless in
a court of equity.
Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall (U. S.) 788,
19 L. Ed. 566 ( 1870),
The conduct of the defendants in this respect
has not been such as to commend them to the
favor of a court of equity.
Under the circumstances, every doubt and difficulty should be
resolved against them . . .
. . . The controlling consideration is, that he
shall not profit by his wrong. A more favorable
rule would offer a premium to dishonesty, and
invite to aggression.
B.

Answering Price Rentals' contention that Penelko

has failed to show that it is entitled to a mandatory injunction.

It is true, as Price Rentals states on page 8 of its

brief, that it is Penelko's position that it is entitled to
a mandatory injunction as a matter of law in view of the fact
that Price Rentals' construction of the restaurant, the curb
and the driveway was intentional and there was involved a
continuing trespass

and irreparable damage which impaired

the just enjoyment of the property.

This was established

without contradiction by the evidence and by force of the
jury's findings in favor of Penelko.

Uptown Appliance Radio

v. Flint, 122 Utah 249, 249 P. 2d 826, at 829 (1952), Flynn

v. Harlin Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P. 2d 356
( 19 73) .
We submit that the authorities we cite on page 7 in
Appellant's Brief support Penelko's position and represent
-

9 -
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the prevailing law under such facts.

Most certainly it is

a law as in Utah as ruled in Henderson v. Ogden City Railway Co., 7 Utah 199, 26 P. 286 (1891).

In Henderson a

mandatory injunction was issued when defendant piled obstructions on plaintiff's roadbed.
more than pile obstructions.

Price Rentals, Inc. did

It built a roadway and striped

and usurped plaintiff's leased parking spaces and built a
restaurant flatly in contradiction of the lease.

As is

stated in 43A C. J. S. §78, Injunctions,
. Repeated or continuous trespasses may be
enjoined, even though each individual act of
tres?ass is in itself trivial, or not desctructi'le, or the damage is trifling, nominal, or
ins 1lbstantial. Furthermore, injunctive relief
may be granted despite the fact that on one
trespass causes irreparable injury. The financial solvency of the trespasser will not preclude injunctive relief, . . .
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P. 2d 136,

(Utah

1976) cited on pages 7 and 8 of Price Rentals' brief, is
manifestly distinguishable.

In Kartchner there was involved

removal of part of a carport in violation of a setback zoning ordinance.

The court held injunction should be denied

for the reason that said ordinance had been enforced in a
discriminatory manner.

The other cases cited on page 6 of

Price Rentals' brief are likewise irrelevant.

-

10 -
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II·

ANSWERING PRICE RENTALS' POINT II THAT APPELLANT
PENELKO IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THE PRESENT ACTION
Answerina Price Rentals' contention that plain-

A.

tiff's claim to attorney's fees is barred by lack of privity.
There was privity.

Price Rentals, in securing from the

Malstroms the rights under Malstroms' lease to Penelko,
signed the transfer from the Malstroms to Price Rentals and
President John Price guaranteed the performance of all the
obligations of the Penelko lease

[page 20 of Exh. 7-PJ.

This gave privity under the decisions of Pickler v. Mershon,
236 N. W. 382, (1931), Schmidt v. Louisville & NR Co.

(Iowa)

139 Ky. 81, 129, 322.

Realty and Rebuildinq Co. v. Rea, 184

Cal. 564, 194 P. 1024,

(1920), cited and quoted pages 8-10,

Penelko's Appellant's Brief.
Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. 99 Utah 214, 104 P. 2d
619,

( 19 40) , cited pp. 5, 14 Price Rentals' brief, is not in

point.

In Latses there was no sale or assianment of the ori-

ginal lease, no prior contract whatsoever between the property.

[See page 10 and 11 of appellant's opening brief.]
B.

In subsection B of Price Rentals' Point II, it con-

tends that appellant's claim for attorney's fees is barred
for failure to produce evidence of attorney's fees during the
trial.
But as pointeCI. out, page 14, of Penelko' s opening brief,
the trial court foreclosed Penelko from adducing evidence to
the jury.

The trial court, in refusing to accept Penelko's
- 11 -
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proposed instruction on same, stated that the issue was for
the court.

The fixing of attorney's fees is traditionally

for the court.

See decisions cited on page 14 and 15,

Penelko's opening brief.
Affidavits for attorney's fees in the amount of $30,000
were filed by Penelko' s attorneys and stand uncontradicted
(1225-1230, 1245-1247].

c.

Under subsection

c

of Price Rentals Point II, it

contends that Penelko's claim for attorney's fees cannot be
sustained because it is impossible to determine whether the
verdict was based upon tortious conduct for breach of lease
and that attorney's fees are not allowed in the absence of
a contractual provision.
But paragraph 20 of the Penelko lease does specifically
provide that the party that fails to perform the lease agrees
to pay all costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's
fees.

[See paragraph 20, Exh. 1-PJ
Price Rentals also contend on pages 21 and 22 of its

brief that the Complaint contains two causes of action.

One,

that the respondent had violated the lease and second, that
Price Rentals had entered into a willful and malicious contract designed to destroy plaintiff's business.
This is not correct.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges a

sinqle cause of action, alleging that all the conduct complained of was in violation of plaintiff's lease.
graph 8 of Complaint]

[See para-

Further, as µointed out on paoes 12
- 12 -
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and 13 of Penelko's opening brief, tortious violation of a
lease entitles a party to attorney's fees when so provided
in the lease, as clearly as a non-tortious violation, if not
more.
D.

In subsection D, page 22 et seq. of Price Rentals'

Point II, it argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to
consider Penelko's motion for attorney's fees because both
parties filed notices of appeal before the motion was heard
by the court.

As pointed out by the court in its Memorandum

Decision and in Appellant's Brief, page 11, the motion for
allowance of attorney's fees was filed July 9, 1979, before
Price Rentals' Inc. filed its Notice of Appeal.

Price Ren-

tals, by the device of filing a notice of appeal before
Penelko's motion for attorney's fees could be heard, could
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on this
undecided issue of attorney's fees [1649].
Consequently, the appeal did not deprive the trial
court to rule on plaintiff's pendina motion for attorney's
fees.

See Morrison v. Morrison, 93 N. J. Super 96, 225 Atl.

2d 19 (1966), where the court ruled:
. . . The aeneral rule is that trial court retains jurisdiction of the matter on appeal to
make determinations collateral or supplemental
to the judgment appealed from. 4 Am. Jur. 2d,
Appeal and Error, § 355 (1926).
Further, Penelko, in order to bring the issue of attorney's fees before this Supreme Court, filed a timely amended
notice of appeal and had all proceedings and evidence on
- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees made part of the record on this appeal.
4

Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error §306-307 cited by Price

Rentals on page 23 of its brief is irrelevant to the point
of frivolity.

These sections deal with the effect of a

motion for new trial extending the time to appeal.
frivolous is

Pr~ce

Rentals' reliance on Rule 72(a)

of Civil Procedure.

Likewise,
Utah Rules

Rule 72(a) provides,

. . . that when other claims remain to be determined in the proceedings, a party may preserve
his right to appeal on the decided issue until
the determination of the other claims by filing
and serving . . . a notice of his intention to
do so.
Penelk0 did not seek to preserve a right to appeal on
a decided issue.

It duly appealed from the decided issues

as soon as they were decided.

On July 25, 1979, Penelko

filed a timely notice of appeal from the lower court's judgment of May 23, 1979, and its order of July 2, 1979, denying
Penelko's motion for injunctive relief [1234].

On Octo-

ber 9, 1979, Penelko filed a timely amended notice of appeal
from the lower court's order denying Penelko's motion for
attorney's fees

[1674].

-

14 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION

Penelko respectfully requests the Supreme Court for
its orders on Appeals Nos. 16588 and 16601 (same case below)
as follows:
1.

Reversal of the lower court's order of July 2,

1979, denying Penelko equitable relief and directing a mandatory injunction against Price Rentals' removing the roadway,
and landscaping over Penelko's leased parking space and
removal of the Perkins Cake & Steak Restaurant (Appeal No.
16601).
2.

Reversal of the lower court's order of September 12,

1979, denying Penelko's motion for attorney's fees in the
amount of $30,000 and for order of the Supreme Court allowing
such fees, plus reasonable attorney fees for work on both
appeals

(Appeals No. 16588 and 16601).

Respectfully submitted December

J5~, 1980.

WILLIAM H. HENDERSON and
MARK s. MINER, Attorneys for
Penelko, Inc.

ByMENLfo~~
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